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Abstract
Transitions to democracy are most often considered the outcome of historical modernization processes. Socio-economic
changes, such as increases in per capita GNP, education levels, urbanization and communication, have traditionally been
found to be correlates or ‘requisites’ of democratic reform. However, transition times and the number of reform steps have
not been studied comprehensively. Here we show that historically, transitions to democracy have mainly occurred through
rapid leaps rather than slow and incremental transition steps, with a median time from autocracy to democracy of 2.4 years,
and overnight in the reverse direction. Our results show that autocracy and democracy have acted as peaks in an
evolutionary landscape of possible modes of institutional arrangements. Only scarcely have there been slow incremental
transitions. We discuss our results in relation to the application of phylogenetic comparative methods in cultural evolution
and point out that the evolving unit in this system is the institutional arrangement, not the individual country which is
instead better regarded as the ‘host’ for the political system.
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Introduction
Our aim in this study was to investigate the cultural evolution of
democracy; how countries change from being an autocracy to being a
democracy and vice versa. An important difference between
biological and cultural evolution is that whereas biological evolution
builds on existing structures and natural selection of randomly
appearing novel variation, cultural traits can be designed and chosen,
that is, selected through cognitive processes. Another important
difference is that whereas biological inheritance is transmitted from
parent to offspring (vertical transfer), cultural information can be
transmitted between any human individuals and collectives of
individuals (horizontal and vertical transfer), for example [1], [2],
[3], [4] [5]. These differences open up for much more rapid changes
and saltationalleaps inculturalevolution. We test this by investigating
all transitions to democracy ever recorded to see if these occurred
through slow gradual reform or rapid changes.
In a similar study of political complexity in Austronesian
societies, Currie et al. [6] mapped political system onto a well-
supported language phylogeny [7], thus assuming that political
complexity spreads vertically, through inheritance over time, while
horizontal transmission, through societies learning from each
other, plays a minor role. They concluded that political complexity
has historically risen and fallen in a sequence of small steps, mainly
within societies. For democratization, however, we have access to
the exact historical sequences of institutional change, enabling us
to investigate the question of amount of horizontal transmission
directly.
Transitions to democracy, which is typically defined as an
‘‘institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people’s vote’’ [8], are commonly
considered the outcome of historical modernization processes.
Socio-economic changes, such as increases in per capita GNP,
education levels, urbanization, and communication, have tradi-
tionally been specified to be correlates or ‘requisites’ of democratic
reform [9], [10], [11], [12], [13].
As Dahl [14] has pointed out, and following him, Vanhanen
[15], democracy can be generalized as an ongoing interplay
between increased participation and contestation (politically as
well as economically), and a variety of its institutional forms has
evolved. Arriving at new and democratic institutional arrange-
ments may require dramatic national upheavals from authoritar-
ianism [16], [17], [18], followed normally by a period of
habituation to – and consolidation of – the early democratic
institutions [19]. However, several classic studies stress the
importance of a ‘democratic culture’ for success in this endeavour
[20], [21].
Some scholars object to an implicit assumption of a final victory
of democracy in all regimes of intermediate and dubious political
character [22]. On the other hand, considering the dramatic and
wave-like diffusion of democracy in the world [23], [24], [25],
[26], [27], [28], [29], [30], other scholars, by means of innovation
diffusion models, have predicted a bright future for democracy on
a world scale [31]. But looking closer into the important details in
this diffusion, the number of years and steps required during
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sively [32], which is the rationale for this study.
The diffusion of democracy in the world system of states has
normally been analyzed as the cumulative change into one
minimum value of democracy in the Polity data sets [25], [27],
[28], [29], [30], [31]. Here, we test whether we find step-wise or
incremental versus rapid or saltational transitions to and from
democracy.
Materials and Methods
We used the Polity IV Data Series [33]. This unique data set
scores nations on political regime characteristics over the years
1800–2008. Scores are assigned to each nation in six variables,
with three variables on executive recruitment: (1) regulation of
chief executive recruitment, (2) competitiveness of executive
recruitment, (3) openness of executive recruitment; one variable
on independence of executive authority: (4) executive constraints
(decision rules); and finally two variables on political competition
and opposition: (5) regulation of participation, and (6) competi-
tiveness of participation.
For each stage in time since 1800, all countries have been coded
with these six component variables, making it possible to classify a
political regime from 4,550 possible institutional arrangements,
which in turn are weighted according to a specified algorithm to
produce autocracy and democracy scores. The sum of these two
scores translates to a polity score on a 21-point scale representing
degree of autocracy and institutional democracy. As an exception,
a country can also be considered in an ‘interruption’, ‘interreg-
num’ or ‘transition period’, which cannot be translated to a polity
score. Countries with a polity score of 26 or lower are classified as
autocracies, while countries with a polity score of 6 or higher are
classified as democracies, and the ones in between as ‘anocracies’.
We have utilized the exact dates provided in the Polity data set
throughout our analyses, rather than using year-by-year data.
To identify possible adaptive peaks in the political regime
landscape, we took note of all historical transitions in polity scores
for all nations over all years covered by the data set. These
transitions where then graphed, enabling us to visually identify
adaptive peaks in the governance landscape. We then identified
every case where a nation had changed from being an autocracy
(polity score #26) to being a democracy (polity score $6),
possibly passing several anocratic institutional arrangements, and
vice versa. The number of days each such transition had taken was
recorded, as well as the number of reform steps each state had
passed. This enabled us to calculate the median time and median
number of steps that transitions to and from democracy have taken
historically.
Results
There are 122 recorded transitions between autocracy and
democracy in the data, of which 79 are from autocracy to
democracy, and 43 in the other direction. The data revealed that
the average length of an institutional period (that is, a period
without changes to any of the six variables) in polity is 9.3 years,
with the median time between changes being 4.6 years. In the 860
cases that institutional transitions have occurred, however, a
significant majority was towards increased democracy (511 cases;
binomial test: p,0.001). Over time, such positive institutional
changes in individual countries have resulted in an increasing
number of democracies across the globe. Our analyses further
showed that institutional transitions cluster in two peaks
representing only the two major regime-types: autocracy and
democracy. Change is much more common within these peaks
than between them (Figure 1).
When changes occur that move countries from autocracy to
democracy, they tend to be very rapid. The median time required
for moving a country from autocracy to democracy is 2.4 years,
with 75% of these transitions occurring within 11 years (Fig. 2a).
Similarly, the median number of intermediate governance states
between autocracy and democracy is 1 state, with 78% of the
changes occurring via at most 2 states (Fig. 2b).
Concerning the transitions in the other direction, from
democracy to autocracy, the speed of change was even more
pronounced. The median time required for moving a country
from democracy to autocracy is 0 years, with 75% of the changes
occurring within 1.4 years (Fig. 2a). A total of 93% of the changes
occurred via at most 1 state (Fig. 2b). Although democratization is
a rapid process, the relapse to autocracy is thus even faster.
As the previous results indicate, most transitions between
democratic and autocratic types of political regimes occur through
a single unique reform of the political system, or through a single
intermediate state. Most of these changes via an intermediate step
tend to go via a form of regime type defined in the Polity IV user’s
manual as a ‘transition period’. Such periods are described as
‘quite fluid, or volatile’, and ‘often result in unintended
institutional arrangements’. Because of this definition, the
‘transition period’ is common en route from autocracy to
democracy, and is an intermediate state in 53% of the transitions
on the way to democracy and 26% of the transitions on the way to
autocracy.
Discussion
We found that autocracy and democracy have acted as peaks in
an evolutionary landscape of possible modes of institutional
arrangements. Movements between these peaks have occurred
rapidly through direct reforms or via a short period of transition.
Only scarcely have there been slow incremental transitions. Thus,
democratization on a global scale the last two centuries has
dominatingly occurred through rapid saltational transitions rather
than through gradual incremental evolution.
Our results highlight two central differences between biological
and cultural evolution. First, the governance system termed
democracy – involving a large number of institutional rules and
regulations – may be chosen by reformers and political actors.
Minor institutional changes can then potentially be locally adapted
to national conditions and therefore be modified and improved,
but this is outside the scope of the Polity IV data set. In its major
institutional foundations democratization has not been slow and
incremental, but rapid and saltational, in waves of democratization
[23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30]. It is highly unlikely
that reformers in several countries have invented democracy
independently of developments in other countries, so democrati-
zation is likely to be a consequence of horizontal transmission.
Indeed, other empirical studies support the conclusion that
democracy diffuses horizontally (in particular, the study by
Wejnert [28] is relevant here).
Second, the amount of horizontal transfer has been shown to be
of importance for the reliability of results of phylogenetic methods
in anthropology (e.g. [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]). In the case of
democracy, horizontal transmission has been the rule rather than
the exception, rendering phylogenetic methods at national level
unusable. Actually, the birth and death of nations does not have a
tree structure, as nations both merge and split. The potential of
vertical transfer is highly limited. Indeed, since 1800, in only three
cases have democratic countries split into two democratic
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Republic and Slovakia, 2006 when Serbia-Montenegro split into
Serbia and Montenegro, and in 2008 when Serbia split into Serbia
and Kosovo).
A reconstruction of democracy as a political system on a
language phylogeny would almost certainly indicate democracy as
the ancestral state for large sections of the phylogeny. However,
since we have exact information of all transitions, we know this not
to be true. Instead all changes from autocracy to democracy have
occurred within countries – reformers have learnt from or been
inspired by the experiences of other countries.
This should serve as a sobering warning against applying
phylogenetic models in studies of cultural evolution. For example,
recently Currie et al. [6] mapped the evolution of political
complexity onto a language phylogeny of the Austronesian
languages. Implicit in applying phylogenetic methodology in that
Figure 2. Rapid gains and losses of democracy. Changes between autocracy and democracy, and vice versa, tend to occur very quickly, both if
(a) measured in units of time and if (b) measured in units of intermediate institutional arrangements.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028270.g002
Figure 1. Two peaks in the evolutionary landscape of political regimes. We noted the source (‘From’) and target (‘To’) polity scores for all
historical transitions in polity scores of all nations over all years present in the Polity IV data set. Since we only registered changes, the diagonal (i.e.
10R10, 9R9, 8R8, etc.) contains empty cells that are smoothed over in the graph. As the graph illustrates, changes in regimes tend to occur within
autocratic or democratic types of regimes, and only seldom between them, or elsewhere in the space of possible transitions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028270.g001
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very little from their neighbours. This may or may not be true, but
it is an issue that should be investigated, not assumed.
In fact, there exist several clear examples where we know traits
to have spread across ethnic borders in traditional societies, even
though we do not have the exact sequence of events. When
Europeans colonized America they brought with them horses.
Native Americans were soon to acquire horses as well as the
culture of herding and breeding these and quickly realized their
utility for hunting, transportation and war. The use of horses
rapidly spread across the many different cultures of Native
Americans on the continent [34]. Travelling the other direction,
maize from South America suited the climate and the needs of the
African continent well. Today, maize is a staple in many African
ethnic groups across the African continent [35]. Similar histories
exist for potatoes, tomatoes, tobacco and cocoa.
These examples highlight that the analogy drawn from
biological evolution, that ethnic groups/nations can be treated
as evolving ‘species’, is questionable. A better analogy would be
that the cultural traits are evolving units in themselves, with
‘morphology’ as given by their characteristics [36]. Ethnic groups/
nation states are in this view better regarded as hosts, or ‘habitats’,
invaded for shorter or longer periods by cultural traits. Once a
cultural trait has evolved, it can spread rapidly across nations as
part of a package of several interrelated cultural traits.
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